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NOTE
SALES

-

WARRANTY AGAINST EVICTION -HEIRS
ESTOPPED TO
PLEAD TEN-YEAR ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION

Plaintiffs, surviving widow and heirs of the deceased, claimed
ownership of a ten-acre tract of land which had been conveyed
to the defendant by the deceased's father. Deceased and his
six brothers and sisters were placed in possession of a large
tract of land, including the ten acres in question, by an ex parte
judgment. Plaintiffs pleaded ten-year acquisitive prescription
offering two instruments upon which they predicated a claim
of just title.' The defendants asserted title on the basis of the
recorded act of sale from deceased's father, which contained a
specific warranty against eviction by the transferor or his heirs,
urging that the plaintiffs were estopped from pleading the prescription of ten years because they were bound by their ancestor's obligation of warranty, since the deceased had unconditionally accepted the vendor's succession, including his obligation
of warranty and the plaintiffs had unconditionally accepted the
succession of deceased. On certiorari to the Louisiana Supreme
Court, held, on rehearing, defendants' plea of estoppel sustained.
Co-heirs obligated to warrant title as was their ancestor-vendor
are estopped to assert title on the basis of ten-year acquisitive
prescription against the ancestor's vendor. Boyet v. Perryman
240 La. 339, 123 So.2d 79 (1960).2
1. The first was a deed from a brother and sister of deceased which conveyed to the remaining five brothers and sisters "all of our right, title and
interest in and to the said estates and successions of our deceased father . . .
and mother . . . and especially the property and lands described in judgment
putting heirs . . . in possession of property as set forth in judgment of record."
Boyet v. Perryman, 240 La. 339, 356, 123 So.2d 79, 85 (1960). The other was
a sheriff's deed in which property belonging to the succession of one of the
brothers and sisters of deceased was sold to a corporation made up of deceased
and three other children and was described as the "E 1/2 of SE 1/4 Sec. 24
T. 18 R. 9 Less small tract in SW corner of SE 1/4 of SE 1/4," which description was the same as in the judgment of possession and would seem to be specific
enough to identify the property.
In order to acquire property on the basis of ten years' acquisitive prescription
four conditions must concur, namely: "1. Good faith on the part of the possessor.
2. A title which shall be legal, and sufficient to transfer the property. 3. Possession during the time required by law, which possession must be accompanied by
the incidents hereafter required. 4. And finally an object which may be acquired
by prescription." IA. CIVIL CODE art. 3479 (1870).
2. On original hearing the court held that since the deed from deceased's
brother and sister to the other children contained a description only by reference
to the judgment of possession they were put on notice to consult the description
in the judgment of possession and once they had commenced the search they
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Unless there is a stipulation to the contrary, the vendor of
immovable property warrants that he conveys good title to the
property.3 By agreement, however, the obligation of warranty
may be modified or dispensed with entirely. 4 Under the code
warranty the vendor warrants title only against rights of eviction arising prior to the sale, 5 except for those which may arise
after the sale by virtue of the vendor's personal act.6 However,
were bound to know all that was discoverable in the record, including the transfer
from the ancestor to the defendant. Bruce v. Cheramie, 231 La. 881, 93 So.2d
202 (1956). Because the court did not consider estoppel by warranty it was
not justified in not discussing the effect of the sheriff's deed as the basis of just
title for ten years' good faith prescription. However, the sheriff's deed adequately
described the property that the brother-sister corporation bought and thus would
have been an instrument translative of title on which ten years' good faith
acquisitive prescription could be based. Because it had not considered this deed
on original hearing the court apparently felt constrained to grant a rehearing.
3. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2501 (1870) : "Although at the time of the sale no
.stipulations have been made respecting the warranty, the seller is obliged, of
course, to warrant the buyer against the eviction suffered by him from the
totality or part of the thing sold, and against the charges claimed on such thing,
which were not declared at the time of the sale." See Jackson v. Breard Motor
Co., 167 La. 857, 120 So. 478 (1929) ; Fee v. Sentell, 52 La. Ann. 1957, 28 So.
279 (1900) ; Dufief v. Boykin, 9 La. Ann. 294 (1854) ; Brown-Roberts Hardware & Supply Co. v. Evans, 153 So. 562 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1934) ; S. P. Weaver
Lumber & Supply Co. v. Paramount Wood Products Co., 146 So. 356 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1933); Stracener v. Nunally Bros. Motor Co., 123 So. 911 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1929).
4. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2503 (1870) : "The parties may, by particular agreement, add to the obligation of warranty, which results of right from the sale,
or diminish its effect; they may even agree that the seller shall not be subject
to any warranty.
"But whether warranty be excluded or not the buyer shall become subrogated
to the seller's rights and actions in warranty against all others."
Vendor added a special warranty and was held bound by both the implied
warranty and the special warranty: Cobb v. Truett, 11 So.2d 120 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1942) ; Field v. Jones, 8 So.2d 711 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1942).
Warranties were diminished or excluded: Lyons v. Fitzpatrick, 52 La. Ann.
697, 27 So. 110 (1900) ; New Orleans & Carrollton R.R. v. Jourdain's Heirs,
34 La. Ann. 648 (1882) ; Pilcher v. Prewitt, 10 La. Ann. 568 (1855) ; Von
Zonneveld Bros. & Philippo Inc. v. Cary, 86 So.2d 252 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1956)
Landreth Seed Co. v. Kerlec Seed Co., 126 So. 460 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1930).
5. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2502 (1870) : "That the warranty should have exist-

ence, it is necessary that the right of the person evicting shall have existed before
the sale. If, therefore, this right before the sale was only imperfect, and is
afterwards perfected by the negligence of the buyer, he has no claim for warranty."
2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LoUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 1490 (1959) : "As a general rule, the vendor
responds only for evictions having a cause anterior to the sale, because an
eviction implies a lack of right in his person. He does not respond for an eviction
the cause of which is posterior, because such evictions are either accidents or
the consequence of a fault committed by the buyer."
6. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2504 (1870) : "Although it be agreed that the seller
is not subject to warranty, he is, however, accountable for what results from
his personal act; and any contrary agreement is void." Louisiana Stave Co. v.
South Arkansas Lumber Co., 135 La. 232, 65 So. 266 (1914) ; Wells v. Blackman,
121 La. 394, 46 So. 437 (1908) ; Boyer v. Amet, 41 La. Ann. 721, 6 So. 734
(1889) ; Clark v. O'Neal, 13 La. Ann. 381 (1858) (the vendee's failure to have
the act of sale recorded, permitting a creditor of the vendor to attach the property and have it sold for his debt, did not release the vendor from his obligation
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it has been held that a vendor may evict his vendee upon a plea
of thirty-years acquisitive prescription, even though this evic7
tion has come about as a result of the vendor's personal act.
In Succession of Zebriska8 this was justified on the proposition
that, "[T]he prescription of 30 years for immovables dispenses
with good faith - extends the shield of its protection as readily
over the trespasser and the thief as over the honest possessor."
From the language of the Zebriska case it would seem doubtful,
however, if the vendor could re-acquire from his vendee by prescription of ten years for want of legal good faith since, as a
part of his case, he must assert that he possessed thinking him-

self to be the true owner.
By accepting a succession unconditionally, an heir accepts
both the rights and obligations of the deceased, including his
obligations of warranty,9 the obligation being indivisible among
the heirs, 10 each bound, as was the ancestor, to warrant the
of warranty. In dictum the court said that the inaction of the vendor in not
paying the debt amounted to an eviction by the vendor's own act.) ; See also
Vos v. Roach, 35 So.2d 142 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1948) ; Whitten v. Monkhouse,
29 So.2d 800 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1947) ; 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN
ENGLISH TRANSLATION
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(1959) ("The warranty against a personal act which obliges the vendor to
respect the possession of the buyer, and the free enjoyment of the thing, has
this in particular about it, that it is always due, even when the warranty against
eviction is withdrawn. Thus the donor is not generally a warrantor against
eviction by a third person; but he always responds for his personal act; he
cannot disturb or evict the warrantor; this contract exonerates him from the
warranty against the act of a third person, hut not from the warranty against
his own act; it would be a fraud on his part to reserve for himself the means
to retake what he has sold, or to prevent the buyer from getting from it all the
profit possible.").
7. Frost Lumber Industries v. Harrison, 215 La. 767, 41 So.2d 674 (1949)
Succession of Zebriska, 119 La. 1076, 44 So. 893 (1907) ; Roe v. Bundy's Heirs,
45 La. Ann. 398, 12 So. 759 (1893).
8. Succession of Zebriska, 119 La. 1076, 1079, 44 So. 893, 894 (1907).
9. Louisiana Canal Co. v. Leger, 237 La. 936, 112 So.2d 667 (1959) ; Arnett
v. Marshall, 210 La. 932, 28 So.2d 665 (1946) ; Cherami v. Cantrelle, 174 La.
995, 142 So. 150 (1932) ; Griffing v. Taft, 151 La. 442, 91 So. 832 (1922);
Cochran v. Gulf Refining Co., 139 La. 1010, 72 So. 718 (1916) ; Sevier v. Gordon,
29 La. Ann. 440 (1877) ; McQueen v. Sandel, 15 La. Ann. 140 (1860) ; Smith
v. Elliot, 9 Rob. 3 (La. 1844).
10. The court in Smith v. Elliot, 9 Rob. 3, 4 (La. 1844) held: "The obligation not to disturb, and even to maintain the purchaser in the quiet enjoyment
of the thing sold, is one to which the plaintiff succeeds upon accepting the estate
of the vendor as heir or co-heir. It is an indivisible obligation so far as it repels
the co-heir who seeks to disturb the title of the purchaser."
In Stokes v. Shackleford, 12 La. 170, 173 (1838), the court said: "[T]he
obligation is indivisible, although, with regard to damages, consequent upon an
eviction each heir may be bound only for his virile share."
2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LouISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 1484 (1959) : "The obligation which is incumbent upon the vendor to defend the buyer is indivisible. It entails proof that
the third person exercising action is without right to do so; this proof will be
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peaceful possession of the whole." In this respect heirs are not
third parties to the sale since they "stand in the shoes" of
their ancestor' 2 and cannot defeat the obligation of warranty
by selling among themselves.' 3 The Louisiana Supreme Court
has demonstrated reluctance to allow heirs to attack titles to
property they warrant. The decisions rest variously upon the
inherited obligation of warranty, 1 4 inherited estoppel, 5 on the
idea that an heir cannot assert any right that his author could
17
not have asserted, 6 and on the doctrine of after-acquired title.
It has been suggested that the principle underlying these decisions is that the legal personality of the ancestor is continued
in the person of the heir.'
However, it would seem no more
objectionable for an heir bound by his ancestor's warranty to
acquire the property by the prescription of thirty years, than
for the ancestor-vendor to have acquired it himself.
completely furnished or it will not. It is a fact which is not susceptible of division.
Therefore the obligation is indivisible.
"It is therefore concluded, that if the vendor is dead leaving several heirs, it
suffices to call one of them into the case to make this proof. He must necessarily
do it for the whole."
11. Louisiana Canal Co. v. Leger, 237 La. 936, 112 So.2d 667 (1959)
Cherami v. Cantrelle, 174 La. 995, 142 So. 150 (1932) ; Griffing v. Taft, 151
La. 442, 91 So. 832 (1922) ; Comment, 15 TUL. L. REv. 117 (1940).
12. Louisiana Canal Co. v. Leger, 237 La. 936, 112 So.2d 667 (1959)
Arnett v. Marshall, 210 La. 932, 28 So.2d 665 (1946) ; Jackson v. United Gas,
196 La. 1, 198 So. 633 (1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 686 (1940) ; Cherami v.
Cantrelle, 174 La. 995, 142 So. 150 (1932) ; Griffing v. Taft, 151 La. 442, 455,
91 So. 832, 837 (1922). In Grilling v. Taft the court said: "[T]he warranty
clause in the deed obligated the vendor, without registry, and the heirs who have
accepted his succession unconditionally have assumed the obligation, whether
they were or were not aware of it when they accepted. Heirs claiming by
inheritance, are not in the situation of third parties. 'Plaintiff and his co-heirs
are not third persons, nor is the community between the plaintiff and his wife a
third person quad the plaintiff himself, the head of and master of the community.
A title good without registry as to the head of the community is likewise good
as to the community.' " Id. at 455, 91 So. at 837.
In Green v. McDade, 17 So.2d 637, 741 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1944), the court
said: "We are of the opinion that heirs succeed to the rights and liabilities of
him from whom they inherit, and, therefore, are chargeable with the effect of
error on his part. Consequently, the defendants in this case cannot 'be considered
as bona fide third parties."
13. Griffing v. Taft, 151 La. 442, 454, 91 So. 832, 836 (1922) : "'His new
title comes from his coheirs, and he cannot undo as an actor that which he would
be compelled to make good as a warrantor.' "
14. Arnett v. Marshall, 210 La. 932, 28 So.2d 665 (1946) ; Jackson v. United
Gas, 196 La. 1, 198 So. 633 (1940) ; Cherami v. Cantrelle, 174 La. 995, 142 So.
150 (1932) ; McQueen v. Sandel, 15 La. Ann. 140 (1860) ; Stokes v. Shackleford,
12 La. 170 (1838) ; Walker v. Fort, 3 La. 535 (1832).
15. Jackson v. United Gas, 196 La. 1, 198 So. 633 (1940) ; Armorer v. Case,
9 La. Ann. 242 (1854) ; Blanchard v. Allain, 5 La. Ann. 367 (1850).
16. Porterfield v. Parker, 189 La. 720, 180 So. 498 (1938).
17. One who warrants title and afterwards acquires the ownership thereof
is bound to convey it to the person favored by the warranty. White v. Hodges,
201 La. 1, 9 So.2d 433 (1942) ; Stokes v. Shackleford, 12 La. 170 (1838).
18. See Comment, 31 TuL. L. REv. 324, 329 (1957).,
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At issue in the instant case was whether the heir of a vendor
may, by prescription of ten years, acquire land from his ancestor's vendee which he warrants title to by virtue of having
accepted the vendor's succession unconditionally. 19 Of crucial
importance is the extent of the inherited warranty. The code
warranty operates against rights of eviction arising prior to
the sale unless the right arises because of the vendor's personal
act. Since in the instant case the right of eviction arose subsequent to the sale, the heirs would not seem obligated to warrant against that right unless they also inherited the vendors'
personal obligation. In the Civil Code, the word "personal" is
used to distinguish between strictly personal and heritable obligations. 20 Because of the reluctance to allow an heir bound by
an obligation of warranty to attack the title of the ancestor's
vendee, it has been suggested that the courts tend to consider
the ancestor's personality to have continued in his heirs. 21 However, to hold heirs bound not to disturb the vendee's title by
their personal acts would seem to be in direct contravention of22
the basic premise that personal obligations are not heritable.
In the instant case the Supreme Court did not seem to consider the applicability of Article 2504 of the Civil Code, but
seems to have assumed that the heirs were bound by unconditional acceptance of the vendor's obligation of warranty not to
disturb the vendee's title on the theory of continued personality.
19. Two cases may have answered this in the affirmative, but it is not entirely
clear. In Arnett v. Marshall, 210 La. 932, 944, 28 So.2d 665, 669 (1946), the
deceased sold land to plaintiff's ancestor with warranty of title. In reality, a
corporation of which deceased was the principal stockholder had title to part of
the land. Deceased was the sole stockholder at the time of the sale. At the time
of the sale, deceased had called in all the stock and was in the process of
liquidating the corporation but as yet had not done so. Defendant unconditionally
accepted deceased's succession and later bought the land in question from the
corporation which was then in receivership and asserted title on that basis. The
court said: "[I]f she were alive, could not recover the 60 acres. Neither can this
defendant; she stands in the same position as Mrs. Sale, having accepted unconditionally her succession and thereby having assumed her obligation of warranty. She is estopped to deny the warranty. [Authorities cited.] This is especially true in view of the fact that the 60 acres really belonged to Mrs. Sale, she
having owned all of the stock of the ....... (Emphasis added.) In Jackson v.
United Gas, 196 La. 1, 198 So. 633 (1940), deceased had presumably inherited
a portion of land and later sold it. After plaintiffs unconditionally accepted his
succession and were later recognized as heirs in their own right to the land in
question, the court held that plaintiffs were estopped to set up any alleged futureacquired title as against the interest which deceased warranted in his sale to
the defendants because they inherited no greater rights than deceased had.
20. See LA. CiviL CoDE arts. 1997, 1998, 2000-2005, 2007 (1870). See also
Comment, 31 TUL. L. REV. 324 (1957), for extensive comment on heritability of
conventional obligations.
21. See note 18 supra.
22. See note 20 supra.
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Only by assuming that the obligation of the vendor not to
interfere with the vendee's title by his personal act is a heritable
obligation could the result of the instant case obtain. It is submitted that, whereas the result of the instant case may seem
more equitable, 23 this result is contrary to that contemplated
by a strict application of the Civil Code articles on the obliga-

tion of warranty.
Roland C. Kizer, Jr.
23. To place the heirs accepting unconditionally in the position of the ancestor and not let them acquire property which the ancestor has warranted could
be a harsh rule in some cases. Suppose the ancestor had sold land to which he
had no title and the heirs later bought the land from the true owner. If the
doctrine of the instant case were applied, the heirs would be in the same position
as the ancestor, and since his title would have inured to the benefit of the vendee
under the doctrine of after-acquired title, the heirs' title would also inure to the
benefit of the ancestor's vendee.

